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I. Legislative and Regulatory Developments
This year’s developments included the State of Oklahoma amending the
Oil and Gas Owner’s Lien Act of 2010 and the Oklahoma Corporation
Commission adopting final versions of several rules, including how the
Commission conducts hearings.
A. State Legislative Developments
1. Oil and Gas Owner’s Lien Act
Senate Bill 632, modifying the Oil and Gas Owners’ Lien Act of 2010, is
effective as of November 1, 2021. The Act amends 52 O.S. 2011, Sections
549.2 and 549.3 to provide for an oil and gas lien to secure the obligation of
any person to pay any proceeds for the acquisition of oil and gas rights.
The Act amends the illustrations of oil and gas rights covered by the Act to
include the following:
(3) proceeds owed for oil and gas drilling and development,
(4) proceeds from the acquisition of oil and gas rights including
but not limited to a lease bonus or pooling bonus,
(5) proceeds from an unfulfilled contract or agreement for the
purchase of mineral rights,1
2. Unclaimed Property Recovery Fees
House Bill 2226, effective November 1, 2021, amends 60 O.S. 2011,
Section 674.1, related to limitations on service fees for recovering unclaimed
property, to provide that “[i]n the event that the claimant of such funds or
property is deceased and did not personally agree to the fee in writing, a fee
for recovery can only be collected from each identified heir, devisee or
legatee that has affirmatively agreed to that fee in writing” as it relates to the
unclaimed funds or property.2
3. Approval of Unitization Plan; Required Interest
House Bill 2029, approved and effective on May 24, 2021, amends 52
O.S. 2011, Section 287.5, relating to ratification or approval of a unitization
plan by lessees and owners, to remove the exclusion of royalty interest
owned by lessees, or subsidiaries of the lessee, from counting towards the

1. 2021 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 93 (West).
2. 2021 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 326 (West).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol7/iss2/19

2021]

Oklahoma

413

requisite sixty three percent (63%) of royalty ownership needed to ratify or
approve a unitization plan. 3
4. Plugging Fund and Production Tax Sunset Extensions
Senate Bill 1059 was passed to amend 17 O.S. Supp. 2020, Section
180.10, related to the Corporation Commission Plugging Fund, to extend the
current law through June 30, 2026. Additionally, the Act amends 68 O.S.
Supp. 2020, Sections 1101, 1102 and 1103 to extend the sunset date for the
current excise and gross production taxes on petroleum oil and natural gas
and/or casinghead gas and the apportionment of such taxes from 2021 to June
30, 2026. The Act allows the current tax rates and the current apportionment
of those taxes to remain in place until 2026.4
5. Oil and Gas Industry Boycotts
On May 25, 2021, the Senate adopted a concurrent resolution relating to
the oil and gas industry, 2021 OK H.C.R. 1011, declaring that “the oil and
gas industry is a vital part of the economy” of Oklahoma and that “those
companies that do business by and through the state . . . should not boycott
the oil and gas industry.” The resolution declares that “the state should not
enter into a contract with a company unless the company submits a written
certification that [it] is not currently engaged in a boycott . . . of the oil and
gas industry” and “should not adopt a procurement, investment or other
policy that has the effect of inducing or requiring” a boycott of the oil and
gas industry.5
B. State Regulatory Developments
1. Regulation Updates
On September 1, 2020, the Oklahoma Corporation Commission
published various permanent final adoptions of rules, effective October 1,
2020, as set forth in 75 O.S. Sections 250.3(5) and 308(E) including: rules
to update, streamline and clarify the Oil and Gas Conservation rules; rules
to update, streamline and clarify existing rules and establish new rules
concerning the Commission’s Rules of Practice, including but not limited to
general clean up, providing consistency between certain provisions,
clarifying how confidential information is to be provided to the
Commission, addressing procedures for telephone and videoconference
3. 2021 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 501 (West).
4. 2021 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 497 (West).
5. 2021 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 1011 (West).
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participation during hearings and allowing electronic signatures of
Commissioners in certain documents; rules to clarify definitions related to
Aboveground Storage Tanks; rules to update references to the Federal
Pipeline Safety Regulations; rules to incorporate statutory changes passed
by the Legislature in 2019 concerning the definition of “Excavation” and
relating to the One-Call System; and rules to clarify the Commission’s role
in enforcing the Underground Natural Storage Facility Act. 6
II. Judicial Developments
This year Oklahoma state courts examined when an overriding royalty
interest owner should know there is a potential cloud on its interest, and
when operations off-unit can maintain a lease. Also, the federal court for
the Western District of Oklahoma tackled how Oklahoma Corporation
Commission orders affect a pooling provision in a lease and when
emissions from operating a well may constitute a trespass.
A. Supreme Court Cases
White Star Petroleum, LLC v. MUFG Union Bank, N.A., 2020 OK 89,
480 P.3d 887
A federal bankruptcy court certified two questions to the Oklahoma
Supreme Court. First, are “trust funds” created by Title 42 O.S. §144.2
limited to obligations due to non-operator joint working interest owners, or
can they include payments due to mechanic’s and materialmen’s lien
holders? Second, does the Oil and Gas Owners’ Lien Act of 2010 grant
working interest owners a lien on well proceeds superior to claims asserted
by mechanic’s and materialmen’s lien holders? 7
White Star Petroleum, LLC (“Plaintiff”) operated oil and gas wells
across Oklahoma. These operations were governed either by joint
operating agreements or pooling orders issued by the Oklahoma
Corporation Commission.8 Also, Plaintiff and other operators entered into
drilling and reworking contracts with third-party service providers, and
those costs were divided between the working interest owners
proportionally. Usually, the operator would bear these costs up front, and

6. 37 Okla. Reg. 1082, 1121, 1126, 1143 (Sept. 1, 2020).
7. White Star Petroleum, LLC v. MUFG Union Bank, N.A., 2020 OK 89, ¶ 1, 480 P.3d
887.
8. Id. ¶ 2.
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then the other owners would reimburse the operator through Joint-Interest
Billing Payments (“JIBs”). 9
Plaintiff filed for bankruptcy, and the Bankruptcy Court for the Western
District of Oklahoma (the “Bankruptcy Court”) approved the sale of almost
all of Plaintiff’s assets to Contango Oil & Gas Company in 2019. 10 During
those proceedings, “78 unpaid vendors filed adversary proceedings seeking
adjudication of statutory lien claims.” 11 Plaintiff responded by initiating its
own adversary proceedings, seeking adjudication of the priority and validity
of 2,000 mechanic’s and materialmen’s liens asserted by those unpaid
vendors. Also, Plaintiff asked the Bankruptcy Court to force several first
purchasers of oil and gas to pay them about $2,000,000, which was being
held in suspense after those purchasers received lien notices from the
unpaid vendors.
To resolve Plaintiff’s adversary proceedings, the
Bankruptcy Court certified the questions to the Oklahoma Supreme Court. 12
The bankruptcy court presented this first question to the Court: “Are the
‘trust funds’ created by Title 42 O.S. §144.2, entitled ‘Creation and
Appropriation of Trust Funds for Payment of Lienable Claims,’ limited to
obligations due non-operator joint working interest owners, or do such
funds include payments due holders of mechanic’s and materialmen’s liens
arising under and perfected by Title 42 O.S. §144?”13 The Court reworded
the question as follows: “Whether the funds held in trust pursuant to Title
42 O.S. §144.2 for payment of lienable claims created by Title 42 O.S.
§144 are limited to joint-interest billing payments received by operators for
services rendered by the lienholders?”14 In other words, can those claims
be paid out of revenue from sources other than JIBs?
Plaintiff argued Title 42 O.S. §144.2 only covers obligations operators
incur with third-parties under drilling and reworking contracts, and since
§144.2(A) is limited to amounts due under those contracts, “the only funds
which must be held in trust to satisfy these obligations are JIBs.” 15 The
Court responded that it found no such limitations in the statute. §144.2(A)
applies to “all lienable claims,” and not just those incurred pursuant to
drilling and reworking contracts.16 Also, the Court found §144.2(A) does
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. ¶ 3.
Id. ¶¶ 5–6.
Id. ¶ 6.
Id..
Id. ¶ 9.
Id. ¶ 10.
Id. ¶ 13.
Id. ¶ 18.
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not reference any specific funds, and does not limit the sources of revenue
subject to the trust funds to just JIBs. 17
The bankruptcy court presented this second question to the Court: “Does
the Oil and Gas Owner’s Lien Act of 2010, Title 52 O.S. §549.1 et seq.,
grant an operator and non-operator working interest owners a lien in
proceeds from purchasers of oil and gas which is prior and superior to any
claim of the holder of a mechanic’s and materialmen’s lien asserted under
Title 42 O.S. §144?”18 Plaintiff noted §549.7 states “‘an oil and gas lien is
a lien that takes priority over any other lien, whether arising by contract,
law, equity or otherwise, or any security interest.’” 19 Plaintiff claims this
language means its own liens and those of other working interest owners
are superior to mechanic’s and materialmen’s liens. 20
The Court responded that the Oil and Gas Owner’s Lien Act defines an
interest owner as “‘a person owning an interest of any kind of nature in oil
and gas rights before the acquisition thereof by a first purchaser.’”21 And
“oil and gas rights” include a “mortgage lien or security interest,” including
in proceeds from the sale of oil and gas.22 Therefore, the Court reasoned
the statute provides all vendors with a lien on the leasehold on which they
performed work, and the sale proceeds as well, putting holders of
mechanic’s and materialmen’s liens on par with working interest owners. 23
Claude C. Arnold Non-Operated Royalty Interest Properties v. Cabot Oil
& Gas Corporation, 2021 OK 4, 485 P.3d 817
This case centered on when an owner of an overriding royalty interest
should have known of the existence of a cloud on its interest. The
Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled subsequently recorded leases do not
necessarily provide notice of an adverse interest. 24
Arnold Petroleum, Inc. (“Arnold”), Plaintiff’s predecessor in title,
obtained six oil and gas leases in Beaver County in 1973.25 Each lease
included the following unusual clause: “Lessee shall not be obligated to
release any formation, horizon, or zone, the production from which would
17. Id. ¶ 19.
18. Id. ¶ 1.
19. Id. ¶ 24.
20. Id.
21. Id. ¶ 25.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Claude C. Arnold Non-Operated Royalty Int. Props. v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp.,
2021 OK 4, 485 P.3d 817.
25. Id. ¶ 3.
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conflict with any existing producing horizon, formation or zone.” 26 In other
words, if Lessee produced from one formation, and production from
another formation would interfere with production from the first formation,
then Lessee did not have to release the second formation.
By 1974, Arnold had assigned all six leases and reserved an overriding
royalty interest. Harold Courson, Defendant’s predecessor in title,
completed two vertical wells in the Chester formation that have
continuously produced since the mid-1970s, and Arnold has continuously
received payments for its overriding royalty interest in those wells. 27
The primary and extended terms of the leases expired in 1981, and
Courson obtained new leases covering the same lands in 1984. The 1984
leases were not limited to any specific formations, and Arnold did not know
of these leases until 1999, despite them being recorded in Beaver County in
1984.28
In 1999, Courson notified Arnold about an additional well completed in
the Chester formation pursuant to the 1984 leases. Arnold reached out to
find out why it was not receiving an override on this new well, and Courson
explained the 1984 leases only covered deep rights, being the formations
that had expired under the 1973 leases. 29
In 2011, Courson assigned all of the leases to Defendant, which drilled
horizontal wells in the Marmaton formation, which is adjacent to the
Chester formation where the original vertical wells were producing.
Defendant’s wells began producing in 2012, and Arnold requested payment
on these wells. Arnold argued the 1973 leases still covered the Marmaton
formation because of the exception clause in those leases. Arnold claimed
the Marmaton was capable of production, but production from the Chester
formation prevented operators from also producing from the Marmaton. In
Arnold’s opinion, this conflict meant the 1973 leases still covered the
Chester and Marmaton formations due to the lease provision concerning
production from neighboring formations. 30
Defendant rejected Arnold’s claim, leading to this lawsuit. Arnold
sought to quiet title to its overriding royalty interest as to the Marmaton.
Defendant responded that Arnold’s claims were barred by a 15-year statute
of limitations which began to run in 1984 when the new leases were
executed and recorded in Beaver County. The District Court ruled for
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. ¶ 4.
Id. ¶ 5.
Id. ¶ 6.
Id.
Id. ¶ 7.
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Arnold, holding the statute of limitations began to run in July 2012, when
Arnold contacted Defendant to request payment. 31 Defendant appealed and
the Court of Civil Appeals reversed the District Court, holding the statute of
limitations began to run in 1984, and Arnold needed to sue by 1999 to
preserve its rights to the Marmaton. 32
The Oklahoma Supreme Court explained the main issue: “when did
Arnold’s cause of action arise?”33 Usually, a cause of action accrues when
an injury occurs, and the Court held Arnold was not injured until July 2012
when it first requested payment from Defendant’s horizontal wells drilled in
the Marmaton formation. 34
Defendant argued the 1984 leases put Arnold on notice of an interest
adverse to its overriding royalty interest. The Court countered that the
recording of the 1984 leases “did not reasonably cast doubt on the viability
of Arnold’s interest in the as-yet-undeveloped Marmaton formation.”35
Evidence at trial indicated production from the Marmaton would have
conflicted with the existing production from the Chester formation,
allowing both formations to be held by production from the Chester due to
the exception clause in the 1973 leases. 36 The 1984 leases did not reference
any specific formations and they did not alter any of the terms in the 1973
leases. Therefore, the Court noted the 1984 leases did not give notice that
Courson considered the Marmaton to be released from the 1973 leases. In
1999, when Arnold contacted Courson, neither party even mentioned the
Marmaton, let alone suggested it had been released from the 1973 leases. 37
The Court explained that from 1984 to 2012, nothing alerted Arnold to
an adverse claim to its interest in the Marmaton formation. 38 Since the
language in the 1973 leases allowed production from the Chester to
perpetuate the leases as to the Marmaton as well, Arnold’s interest in the
Marmaton was not “injured” until 2012, when Defendant began producing
from the Marmaton. Therefore, Arnold’s cause of action accrued in 2012,
not in 1984. Arnold filed a timely lawsuit, and the Court affirmed the
District Court’s judgment.39
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. ¶ 8.
Id. ¶ 9.
Id. ¶ 12.
Id.
Id. ¶ 13 (emphasis in original).
Id. ¶ 14.
Id. ¶ 16.
Id.
Id. ¶ 19.
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Highpointe Energy v. Viersen, 2021 OK 32, 489 P.3d 28
This case examined two competing chains of title emanating from a
sheriff’s deed and bankruptcy proceedings. The Supreme Court of
Oklahoma held the purchasers from the sheriff’s deed had superior title
because the purchasers from the bankruptcy proceeding bought their
interest subject to the mortgage foreclosure that led to the sheriff’s sale. 40
Highpointe Energy (“Plaintiff”) filed a quiet title action against Viersen
(“Defendant”) concerning mineral interests in McClain County. The
District Court ruled Plaintiff owned the superior interest, and Defendant
appealed.41
In 1923, Carry Hughes owned the 90 net mineral acres in question. She
mortgaged her interest that same year to Pittsburg Mortgage Investment
Company, which assigned the mortgage to The Women’s Home Missionary
Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church (the “Missionary”). That
assignment was recorded in 1925.42
In 1927, Hughes sold portions of her mineral interest to various parties,
including Cal-Cul Oil Company (“Cal-Cul”).43 In 1933, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma adjudged Cal-Cul
bankrupt and appointed a bankruptcy trustee (the “Trustee”). In 1936,
while the bankruptcy was still pending, Missionary initiated foreclosure
proceedings in McClain County on the mineral interest subject to the 1923
mortgage. Missionary included as defendants/interest owners Hughes, CalCul, and other individuals who had bought portions of the mineral interest
from Hughes. The Trustee accepted service of the foreclosure action on
behalf of Cal-Cul, but the Trustee never filed notice of the bankruptcy in
McClain County.44
In 1937, the Trustee sold Cal-Cul’s assets, including the mineral interest
purchased from Hughes in 1927, and this interest eventually passed to
Defendant (the “Viersen Chain”).45 In 1938, after the Trustee’s deed had
been recorded in McClain County, Missionary obtained title to the disputed
mineral interest pursuant to a judgment in the foreclosure, and this interest
eventually passed to Plaintiff (the “Missionary Chain”). 46
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Highpointe Energy v. Viersen, 2021 OK 32, 489 P.3d 28.
Id. ¶ 9.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id. ¶ 4.
Id. ¶ 6.
Id. ¶ 7.
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In 2019, Plaintiff and Defendant both filed competing quiet title actions,
claiming their chain of title was superior. 47 The District Court ruled the
Missionary Chain was superior because the foreclosure action gave notice
to the Trustee, so the 1937 Trustee’s deed was essentially made subject to
the foreclosure proceedings.48
Referencing its 1963 decision in Viersen v. Boettcher,49 a case also
involving a bankruptcy proceeding and a foreclosure action, the Court set
forth a few rules regarding a bankruptcy trustee’s sale. First, the bankrupt’s
interest passes to the Trustee subject to any outstanding liens, “unless the
bankruptcy sale is specifically free from liens.” 50 Second, “[i]f the sale is
not expressly ordered to be free and clear of liens,” then the sale is subject
to liens, and the Trustee is not considered an innocent purchaser for value. 51
And third, “a purchaser from a trustee takes no better title than the bankrupt
or trustee had.”52
Regarding a sheriff’s sale, the Court stated a foreclosure action only
affects interest owners who are made a party to the action. Since Viersen
was not made a party to the foreclosure action in Viersen v. Boettcher, his
interest was not foreclosed, and Boettcher did not acquire same. Since the
foreclosure action did not include the bankruptcy trustee as a party, the
foreclosure proceeding was void as to the trustee’s interest. Therefore, in
Viersen v. Boettcher, the Court held Viersen obtained superior title
pursuant to the bankruptcy trustee’s sale. 53
In contrast, in this case, Missionary gave the Trustee notice of the
foreclosure action and the Trustee did not file notice of the bankruptcy
proceeding in the foreclosure. 54 The Court noted the Trustee’s deed was
filed before the Sheriff’s deed, but the bankruptcy sale was not free of
liens.55 Pursuant to Boettcher, “the Trustee did not obtain any more rights
to the disputed property than Cal-Cul had when it entered bankruptcy,” and
the Trustee’s sale was subject to Missionary’s mortgage. 56

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. ¶¶ 8–9at 31.
Id. ¶ 10.
1963 OK 262, 387 P.2d 133.
Highpointe Energy, ¶ 15.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 16.
Id. ¶ 20.
Id. ¶ 19.
Id.
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Therefore, the Court held this case did not turn on notice. 57 Cal-Cul’s
interest was subject to the foreclosure, so the Trustee’s interest was also
subject to the foreclosure. Since the Trustee’s sale was not made free of
liens, any party who purchased the interest from the Trustee did so subject
to the foreclosure. So when Missionary’s mortgage was foreclosed upon, it
wiped away any interest purchased from the Trustee. The Court affirmed
the District Court and ruled in favor of Plaintiff. 58
B. Appellate Activity
Lawson, Tr. of Harold Lawson Living Tr. v. Citizen Energy II, 2021 OK
CIV APP 1, 481 P.3d 287
In a case of first impression, the Court of Civil Appeals held a lease
could be maintained beyond its primary term by operations conducted offunit.59
The June 2014 Lawson Lease covered 320 acres in Section 11, Township
North, Range 6 West, Canadian County. 60 The Oklahoma Corporation
Commission (the “OCC”) established Section 11 as a 640 acre drilling and
spacing unit and pooled Section 11.61 On the same date, the OCC also
pooled Section 14, the section immediately south of Section 11. 62 Then
Citizen Energy II, LLC (“Operator”) applied for a multi-unit horizontal
well across Sections 11 and 14.63 The OCC granted this application in May
2017.64
Operator commenced the McWhirter 1H-14-11 well from a surface
location in the southeast quarter of Section 14, with the intention of drilling
from south to north and eventually penetrating Section 11. 65 Operator
began work on the McWhirter well on Section 14 before the primary term
of the Lawson Lease expired, but the well did not penetrate Section 11 until
after the Lawson Lease expired. 66

57. Id. ¶ 24.
58. Id. ¶ 25.
59. Lawson, Tr. of Harold Lawson Living Tr. v. Citizen Energy II, 2021 OK CIV APP
1, ¶ 1, 481 P.3d 287.
60. Id. at ¶ 2.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at ¶ 3.
66. Id.
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The Canadian County District Court granted summary judgment in favor
of the Operator.67 Lawson appealed and argued the operations on Section
14 did not extend the Lawson Lease into its secondary term because no
operations existed on Section 11 itself, being the leased premises. 68
The Lawson Lease states the lessee must “commence to drill a
well…within the term of the lease…or on acreage pooled therewith.” 69
Lawson argued the lease required Operator to physically enter the leased
premises during the primary term.70 Operator responded physical entry was
not required, and that drilling in Section 14 extended the lease pursuant to
the commencement clause.71
The court noted the Oklahoma Legislature’s 2011 Shale Reservoir
Development Act, which permitted multiunit horizontal wells, or a well
completed in two or more units. 72 Specifically, the statute provides “[a]
multi-unit horizontal well shall be treated as a well in each of the affected
units and shall be subject to all of the rules otherwise applicable to any
other well in any of the affected units.” 73
In its multiunit horizontal well application, Operator stated the Woodford
and Mississippian common sources of supply underlie Sections 11 and 14. 74
Operator proposed to drill the well under both sections and requested the
OCC to commingle production and allocate costs between each section. 75
The court explained that since Sections 11 and 14 are both “affected units,”
a well drilled in either unit is considered a well drilled in both units. 76
Therefore, the court held commencement activities in Section 14 are treated
as commencement activities in Section 11, and the McWhirter well
perpetuated the term of the Lawson lease. 77

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at ¶ 4.
Id. at ¶ 7.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 11.
Id. ¶ 13.
Id. at ¶ 14.
Id.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 15.
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C. Federal Cases
Cline v. Sunoco, Inc. (R&M), 479 F.Supp.3d 1148 (E.D. Okla. 2020)
The Production Revenue Standards Act (the “PRSA”) sets out when a
well operator or first purchaser of oil and/or gas must pay royalty owners
for proceeds from a well.78 And if those payments are not made on time,
the PRSA dictates how much interest must be paid on any late payments. 79
In this case, Plaintiff challenged Defendant’s practice of not paying
statutory interest on late payments.80
Perry Cline is the lead plaintiff in a class of owners with interests in oil
wells in Oklahoma. Defendant buys oil from those wells and sells the oil. 81
Then Defendant pays the proceeds to the parties who own an interest in the
wells pursuant to PRSA.82 Plaintiff sued Defendant for failing to pay
interest on late payments, also claiming Defendant committed fraud by not
admitting to owing interest on such late payments. 83
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma
explained the questions at hand: Under the PRSA, does Defendant
automatically owe statutory interest on late payments? Does interest
continue to accrue if Defendant does not pay interest with the late payment?
Is it fraud if Defendant does not disclose it owes interest? And how much
does this Defendant owe in interest on late payments? In 2019, the Court
found Defendant must automatically pay statutory interest with a late
payment.84
The PRSA requires a first purchaser to pay proceeds to owners within six
months from the date of first sale and within two months after the month of
subsequent sales, subject to various exceptions. 85 Generally, the PRSA
requires 12% interest to be added to all late payments.86 However, if the
interest owner does not have marketable title, the interest rate drops to
6%.87

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Cline v. Sunoco, Inc. (R&M), 479 F.Supp.3d 1148, 1157 (E.D. Okla. 2020).
Id.
Id. at 1148.
Id. at 1155.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1157.
Id. at 1157-1158.
Id.
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Defendant processes payments for millions of owners, and it does not
automatically pay interest on late payments. 88 Per its own policy,
Defendant only pays interest when requested by the owner. 89 And when
Defendant does pay interest, it only pays interest due “through the date
[Defendant] paid the proceeds to the owner,” as opposed to the date when
the interest is actually paid.90 Defendant argued the PRSA does not include
a due date for interest on late payments.91
The Court largely relied on Plaintiff’s expert to determine the amount of
interest Defendant owed. Based on sale date, payment date, and a host of
other data, the expert determined Defendant made more than 1.5 million
late payments to about 53,000 class members.92 Based on the 12% interest
rate, Defendant owed almost $75,000,000 in interest. 93 Defendant argued
some of those late payments were based on lack of marketable title, and
therefore, the 6% interest rate should apply. 94
The Court explained Defendant had the burden of proving it withheld
payment due to issues with an owner’s marketability. 95 The PRSA
establishes the 6% interest rate as an exception to the 12% rate. The Court
noted the class members are entitled to the proceeds and interest regardless,
so they do not have the burden of proving marketability. 96 The Court
framed “unmarketability” as an affirmative defense; therefore, the burden is
on the Defendant.97 To determine marketability, Defendant relied on its
suspense codes, but it did not identify any owners who did not have
marketable titles. 98 And even when paying proceeds to the owners,
Defendant never raised the issue of marketability. 99 Ultimately, Defendant
failed to meet its burden of proving any interest owners had unmarketable
title, and the Court applied the 12% interest rate to every late payment. 100

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 1160.
Id.
.Id.
Id.
Id. at 1161.
Id.
Id. at 1162-1163.
.Id. at 1169.
Id. at 1171.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1175.
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Also, the Court held the PRSA allows for compound interest, paying
interest on interest.101
Turning to late payments made to unclaimed property funds, Defendant
argued late payments to the State of Oklahoma for unclaimed property
should not be included in the total because it should not have to pay interest
to unclaimed property funds.102 Defendant claimed these owners were
never injured because they did not know they were owed anything, let alone
interest.103 The Court ruled Defendant knew the identities of many of these
owners, and the injury occurred the moment they were owed proceeds and
did not receive them. 104 Paying the State is essentially “paying the owner
or an agent or trustee on behalf of the owner.”105 The PRSA does not
exempt unclaimed property funds from its timing requirements, and interest
accrues until the date paid. 106 Therefore, the Court held Defendant owed
interest on late payments to unclaimed property funds, and it owed interest
through the date it pays those funds to the State. 107
And regarding Plaintiff’s fraud claim, the Court held Plaintiff did not
prove fraud.108 Plaintiff argued Defendant should have disclosed the
interest owed to the owners.109 Defendant noted it included check stubs
with every royalty check, and those stubs contain all the information
required by the PRSA.110 The Court ruled Defendant did not have an
additional duty to “inform interest owners that it withheld interest from a
late payment.”111
Finally, the Court discussed the damages awarded to Plaintiff. The
Court found $75,000,000 in actual damages, the total put forth by Plaintiff’s
expert, to be reasonable based on the language of the PRSA and the
expert’s methodology. 112 Regarding punitive damages, Plaintiff sought
twice the amount of the actual damages, or an amount equal to the actual
damages. 113 The Court examined Oklahoma’s punitive damages statute and
101.
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found Defendant’s actions did not warrant double damages because
Defendant did not act with malice, rather with a reckless disregard for
Plaintiff’s rights.114 Therefore, the Court awarded Plaintiff $75,000,000 in
punitive damages.115
Curtis Cory et al. v. Cimarex Energy Co., 2021 WL 1108596 (W.D.
Okla. Mar. 23, 2021)
What happens if a pooling provision in a lease conflicts with an order
from the Oklahoma Corporation Commission? Cory v. Cimarex details
how a court resolves such a conflict.116
Cory (“Plaintiff”) owned a mineral interest in an 80 acre tract out of
Section 25, Township 15 North, Range 9 West, Kingfisher County,
Oklahoma, subject to a 1977 lease now owned by Cimarex
(“Defendant”). 117 The lease included a pooling provision limiting units to
160 acres for oil wells and 640 acres for gas wells. 118
In 2015, the Oklahoma Corporation Commission (the “OCC”) entered
Order No. 643680, establishing Section 25 as a 640 acre unit (the
“Unit”). 119 This Order found the Unit was “necessary to protect correlative
rights, prevent…waste[,] and obtain the greatest ultimate recovery of oil
and gas.”120 Then Defendant drilled a horizontal oil well called the Loretta
1-25H well (the “Loretta well”). 121
In 2020, Plaintiff sued Defendant for breach of contract, conversion, and
declaratory judgment. In response, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the
case.122
Plaintiff claimed Defendant violated the lease’s pooling provision by
drilling the Loretta well. 123 Defendant argued the OCC order superseded
the pooling provision, and the court agreed. 124 Defendant claimed the
parties intended the pooling provision would “yield to any conflicting
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unitization order issued by the OCC.”125 In support of this position,
Defendant relied on two cases: Hladik v. Lee and Oklahoma Natural Gas
Company v. Long.126
In Hladik, a lessee pooled ten separate tracts to create a 480 acre
“declared” unit.127 Afterwards, the OCC issued a spacing order creating a
160 acre “compulsory” unit within the larger 480 acre unit. 128 The parties
disagreed on how to distribute royalties from gas production within the
compulsory unit.129 The Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled the compulsory
unit superseded the declared unit.130 The court explained “oil and gas
leases are negotiated against the backdrop of the OCC’s regulatory
authority;” therefore, the parties must have understood that when the OCC
exercised its regulatory authority, same would control over any conflicting
lease provisions.131
In Long, the lease provided the lessee must commence the drilling of a
well on the leased property within one year or pay delay rentals to the
lessor.132 After the parties executed the lease, the OCC issued a spacing
order establishing a 640 acre unit including the leased property, and a well
was drilled on that unit.133 Lessor sued to cancel the lease, arguing the
lease expired because the lessee stopped paying delayed rentals and the
lessee never drilled a well on the leased property, only on the unit. 134 The
Oklahoma Supreme Court held the parties contracted subject to the OCC’s
authority to “enact well-spacing regulations in furtherance of conserving oil
and gas[.]”135 Therefore, the OCC spacing order superseded the conflicting
lease provision, and production from the well on the unit maintained the
lease.136
Based on these two Oklahoma Supreme Court decisions, the District
Court held the OCC’s regulatory authority is incorporated into oil and gas
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leases by operation of law. This is particularly the case when a lease’s
pooling provision notes mineral conservation as its primary objective. 137
Barton v. Ovintiv Mid-Continent, Inc., 2021 WL 1566451 (W.D. Okla.
Apr. 21, 2021)
When might emissions from oil and gas operations constitute a trespass?
What duty does an operator owe to a landowner? The United States
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma answered these
questions in relation to operations in Kingfisher County.138
In 2004, Kenny and Julie Barton (“Plaintiff”) bought a home and seven
acres in Kingfisher, Oklahoma. 139 As a result of a 2019 divorce, Kenny
Barton owns the property and pays the mortgage on the same. 140
The Oklahoma Corporation Commission (the “OCC”) established a 640
acre spacing unit for a section of land which included Plaintiff’s
property. 141 This order granted Ovintiv (“Defendant”) the right to drill a
horizontal well anywhere in the section, and drilling began in June of 2020
within several hundred feet of Plaintiff’s property. 142 Before commencing
the well, Defendant knew it would need additional casing due to the
“known potential risk of encountering an over-pressurized zone in the
morrow series in the area.”143
Defendant’s operations brought continuous noise in the daytime and
light at night.144
Emissions from the rig caused the Plaintiff
lightheadedness and nausea.145 In July of 2020, Plaintiff evacuated to a
hotel and Defendant paid for Plaintiff’s stay.146
Plaintiff complained and the Oklahoma Department of Environmental
Quality (the “ODEQ”) inspected the property, detecting gassy emissions
from Defendant’s operations. 147 Plaintiff installed a carbon monoxide
detector in their home and the level was high enough to result in
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“hallucinations, dementia, and serious headaches within one to two hours
and risk of death after three hours.”148
In August of 2020, Defendant completed the initial drilling of the well
and Plaintiff moved back onto the property. 149 Then Defendant fracked the
well near Plaintiff’s home, resulting in additional concerns for the Plaintiff,
such that they moved out of their home and intended to sell the property. 150
First, Plaintiff sued for trespass, claiming Defendant’s operations
resulted in “dangerous levels of emissions” entering their property. 151
Defendant responded there was never any physical invasion of the property,
and Oklahoma law treats intangible intrusions (e.g., smoke, noise, odor,
light) as a nuisance instead of a trespass.152
Plaintiff argued poisonous fumes are different from smoke or odor
because they rendered the home uninhabitable. 153 Defendants countered
that contamination does not qualify as a tangible trespass unless it is
palpable, or can be felt by touch.154 Also, Defendant argued Plaintiff has
not alleged any physical damage to their property, only interference with
the use of their property. 155
The Court dismissed the trespass claim, ruling Plaintiff had not alleged a
“plausible claim of trespass;” holding the emission was only an intangible
intrusion.156 Under Oklahoma law, an intangible intrusion only qualifies as
a trespass if there has been substantial damage to the property, and Plaintiff
has not alleged any facts claiming such damage. 157
Second, Plaintiff alleged Defendant interfered with a prospective
economic advantage. 158 Plaintiff claimed the mortgage created a business
relationship between Kenny Barton and the mortgagee; “Kenny entered into
that relationship with the intent of receiving a benefit of asset appreciation
on the property.”159 Once Plaintiff was forced to sell the property, it lost
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out on any asset appreciation, and Defendant should have known that
drilling a well would cause such a result. 160
Defendant responded that the mortgage was a debt and not a business
relationship, and Plaintiff has not alleged Defendant acted with malice. 161
Plaintiff claimed drilling the well so close to the house caused the home’s
value to decline, so the drilling was a malicious act.162
The Court ruled Plaintiff failed to bring forth a plausible claim for
intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage. 163 There is
no business relationship or expectation of profit and Plaintiff did not allege
the Defendant acted in bad faith. 164 Without that element, the Court
dismissed this claim. 165
Next, Plaintiff alleged drilling so close to their property made Defendant
strictly liable for any damages caused because operating an oil and gas well
is an ultrahazardous activity. 166 Defendant replied any risks can be
mitigated through reasonable care, specifically by setting back the well
from the property.167 The Court held this claim could go forward because
the record was too undeveloped for the Court to decide if Plaintiff had
pleaded sufficient facts.168
Finally, Plaintiff claimed Defendant’s decision to locate and drill the
well so close to their property was negligent. 169 Defendants argued it did
not breach any duty to Plaintiff and it only had to act as a reasonably
prudent operator.170 Plaintiff countered that the risk of encountering an
over-pressurized zone meant Defendant should have drilled the well farther
away from the property. 171
After discussing a Kingfisher City Ordinance and Oklahoma state law,
the Court held Plaintiff pleaded sufficient facts to move forward with its
negligence claim. 172 The court explained Plaintiff may have a claim that
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Defendant breached a duty of due care to Plaintiff and that breach caused
injuries to Plaintiff. 173

173. Id. at 7.
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